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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 10, 2014, the Sixth Circuit established a new standard 
plaintiffs must meet to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).1 With this new 
standard, the court reentered the battleground of securities fraud actions 
arising out of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5.2 In KBC Asset 
Management N.V. v. Omnicare, Inc. (In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities 
Litigation),3 the court attempted to clarify the complex relationship between 
the PSLRA and § 10(b) actions, creating a new standard for successfully 
pleading securities fraud. Under the new standard, courts must first analyze 
whether there is a material misrepresentation or omission objectively, then 
determine corporate scienter by taking into account the state of mind of some, 
but not all, corporate employees.4 While this new standard does help clarify 
                                                                                                                     
  J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2015; 
B.A., The Ohio State University. Thanks to Jackson Froliklong, Ryan Harmanis, Jared 
Hasson, Professor G. Paul Rose, and Jordan Watrous for their incredibly helpful comments 
on this piece. 
 1 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2012). 
 2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2014). 
 3 KBC Asset Mgmt. N.V. v. Omnicare, Inc. (In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 769 
F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 4 See id. at 470–75. 
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the pleading requirements of a § 10(b) action, it is doubtful that the court’s 
decision will meaningfully change the results of such disputes. 
II. IN RE OMNICARE, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION 
On December 1, 2008, John Stone, then Omnicare’s Vice President of 
Internal Audit, was discharged from his employment by the company.5 In the 
wake of his firing, he filed a False Claims Act qui tam6 action against 
Omnicare alleging fraud and improper termination.7 The allegations centered 
on a series of audits conducted internally by Omnicare that professed to show 
noncompliance with Medicare and Medicaid requirements and pervasive fraud 
at the audited Omnicare facilities.8 Stone alleged that he was terminated for 
presenting the results of the final “Pharmacy Audit” to the Omnicare president 
at the time, Joel Gemunder.9  
On May 11, 2012, after the audits and qui tam action became public, KBC 
Asset Management N.V. (KBC) filed a class action suit on behalf of several 
Omnicare shareholders.10 KBC claimed that Omnicare and several of its 
officers committed securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the audits, along with other evidence, showed Omnicare 
materially misrepresented or omitted information about the company’s 
compliance with Medicare and Medicaid regulations in public statements and 
SEC filings.11 These statements, which include statements by Gemunder and 
statements on SEC Form 10-K filings, were qualified and were not made in 
hard, definitive terms.12 For example, the 10-K filing in question stated that 
“[Omnicare] believe[s] that [its] billing practices materially comply with 
applicable state and federal requirements.”13 Omnicare moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim and the district court granted the motion, finding that 
the plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient facts with enough particularity to 
satisfy the heightened PSLRA standards.14 
Securities fraud under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 has six 
elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant” 
                                                                                                                     
 5 Id. at 463. 
 6 In a qui tam action, a private party brings a suit on behalf of the government to 
“recover a remedy for a harm done to the government.” 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and 
Penalties § 83 (2014). In this case, Mr. Stone “filed a twenty-four-count qui tam action 
against Omnicare under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company committed 
various kinds of fraud and improperly terminated his employment.” In re Omnicare, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 463. 
 7 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 463. 
 8 Id. at 462–63. 
 9 Id. at 463. 
 10 Id. at 460, 463. 
 11 Id. at 461. 
 12 Id. at 464. 
 13 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 464 (emphasis added). 
 14 Id. at 465. 
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(Element One); “(2) scienter” (Element Two); “(3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) 
loss causation.”15 The parties only disputed Element One and Element Two on 
appeal, and the court analyzed both at length.  
Element One, the “material misrepresentation or omission” element, is 
actually three separate inquiries. First, the court must determine if the 
statement is material—meaning that a reasonable shareholder would consider 
the information important in deciding how to vote.16 Second, the court must 
separate misrepresentations and omissions and analyze each under different 
standards.17 Third, the court must distinguish objectively verifiable 
information from soft, opinion-type information and apply different tests to 
these as well.18  
Successfully pleading Element Two, the scienter element, in securities 
fraud cases is also difficult because plaintiffs must plead this element with 
particularity to satisfy the heightened PLSRA requirement.19 This inquiry 
becomes even more complex if the corporate entity itself is a defendant 
because the court must determine whose knowledge matters for the purposes 
establishing sufficient scienter.20 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit formulated a 
novel standard for determining scienter in securities fraud cases that represents 
the middle ground between existing circuit court tests.21 Under this new 
formulation, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Id. at 469 (citation omitted). 
 16 See id. at 470–72. 
 17 See id. at 470–72. 
 18 Id. at 470. These three inquiries will be explored further in Part III. See infra Part 
III. 
 19 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 473. The Supreme Court of the United 
States interpreted this PLSRA language in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., and 
created a three-part test for courts to apply when assessing the scienter element. 551 U.S. 
308, 322–23 (2007). Courts assessing a plaintiff’s scienter allegations in securities fraud 
cases must (1) “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true[;]” (2) “‘consider the 
complaint in its entirety and decide whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter;” and (3) “assuming that plaintiff’s allegations create a 
powerful or cogent inference of scienter . . . a court must compare this inference with other 
competing possibilities, allowing the complaint to go forward only if a reasonable person 
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least compelling as any opposing 
inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 
F.3d at 473 (quoting Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322–23) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 474. 
 21 See id. at 474–75. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits will only allow scienter to be 
imputed to corporations under the theory of respondeat superior, and do not consider any 
collective corporate scienter. Id. at 473–74. Therefore, these two circuits represent the most 
corporation-friendly circuits while other courts, such as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits, do allow at least some determination of collective corporate scienter outside of 
looking specifically at the mindset of the officers who made the allegedly misleading 
statements. Id. at 474–75 (citations omitted). 
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plaintiff’s claims against both the individual defendants and Omnicare as a 
corporation.22 
III. THE NEW STANDARD 
In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit took the opportunity to 
clarify a small pleadings portion within the complex world of securities fraud 
litigation. Under the new Sixth Circuit standard, courts must analyze Element 
One—that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission—
objectively.23 This is an important clarification because, previously, if a court 
analyzed a soft information misrepresentation, the court often conflated this 
analysis with Element Two.24 Initially, a plaintiff must now plead facts 
sufficient to show that the information in question was material, meaning that 
the information “would change an investor's mind about whether to buy or sell 
stock.”25 Then, if the plaintiff alleges a misrepresentation, the plaintiff must 
show that the information is objectively false or misleading in light of what is 
known at the time of the suit.26 If the plaintiff alleges an omission, the plaintiff 
must plead facts sufficient to show that the omission occurred where the 
corporation had a duty to disclose.27 The court noted that if a reasonable jury 
could find the information in a corporate statement to be objectively false, that 
same jury could find that a duty to disclose existed, satisfying the requirements 
of an omission under Element One.28 
If the plaintiff survives Element One with respect to either a 
misrepresentation or omission, pleading Element Two under the new standard 
remains a difficult, subjective inquiry. For cases with corporate defendants, the 
Sixth Circuit sought to find a balance between plaintiffs abusing loose 
interpretations of a previous Sixth Circuit decision29 and corporations avoiding 
liability for defrauding the public through “tacit encouragement and willful 
ignorance.”30 Under the new standard, the state of mind of all the following 
are probative to the court when determining if the plaintiff established that the 
corporate defendant knew the statement was false or misleading: (1) the 
individual who made the statement in question; (2) any agent of the 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Id. at 484. 
 23 Id. at 470. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. at 478. 
 26 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 470. 
 27 See id. at 479–80. 
 28 See id. at 480–81. 
 29 City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 
2005). The court in City of Monroe allowed plaintiffs to impute knowledge of a corporate 
officer to the corporation when the officer was not even involved in making the statement. 
See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 474. Here, the court was concerned that 
the City of Monroe decision “could expose corporations to liability far beyond what 
Congress has authorized.” Id. at 475. 
 30 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 477. 
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corporation who prepared, reviewed, approved, or even furnished information 
for the statement; and (3) any director or high-level manager who approved, 
recklessly disregarded, or tolerated the misrepresentation after its issuance.31 
This formulation goes beyond the narrow respondeat superior interpretation of 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,32 but stops short of allowing consideration of 
the mindsets of employees who were not connected to the statement.  
Here, although the Sixth Circuit reached the same ultimate decision as the 
district court, the courts disagreed in several important respects. Most notably, 
the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had, in fact, satisfied their pleadings 
burden with respect to Element One of the § 10(b) test.33 So while the 
plaintiffs failed before the district court even reached further elements of the 
§ 10(b) test, the Sixth Circuit’s new objective analysis of the existence of a 
material misrepresentation or omission allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to 
Element Two.  
IV. NEW RESULTS? 
The Sixth Circuit’s new standard appears to be a sensible middle ground. 
Will this new standard, however, really impact the results of securities fraud 
cases? Will more cases proceed past the motion to dismiss stage because 
judges must now consider the mindset of lower level employees who were 
indirectly involved in the creation of public statements? The answers to these 
complicated questions lie in how future courts apply this test.  
While the Sixth Circuit’s new formulation allowed the KBC plaintiffs to 
proceed to the scienter requirement, this may well be a hollow victory for 
future plaintiffs because the plaintiffs here still failed to satisfy Element Two 
of the test. This raises the question of whether the new standard actually 
improves the lot of plaintiffs or just defers their ultimate failure until later in a 
court’s opinion. In soft information cases involving vague opinion statements 
there remains a high bar for plaintiffs to plead sufficient facts to show that 
individual defendants had actual knowledge of the statement’s falsity. Even 
where the court now allows an individual employee’s knowledge to be 
imputed to the corporation, it may not be sufficient to establish a strong 
inference that the defendant acted to defraud the public.34  
So while the Sixth Circuit’s new standard embraces a reasonable middle 
ground and helps to clarify the first two elements of the § 10(b) test, plaintiffs 
still face the same obstacles of pleading fraud with sufficient particularity to 
                                                                                                                     
 31 Id. at 476. 
 32 See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th 
Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1018–19 (11th Cir. 
2004). These courts look only to the state of mind of the individual corporate officials or 
employees who have a hand in creating the statement, rather than to the collective 
knowledge of all employees. See id. 
 33 In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d at 481. 
 34 See id. at 484. 
160 IN RE OMNICARE, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION [2015 
satisfy the PLSRA. This may help future courts more accurately apply the 
correct set of pleadings requirements for § 10(b) actions without much effect 
on a plaintiff’s chances of advancing the litigation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Attaining clarity in securities fraud cases can seem, at times, like a 
Sisyphean task. The overlapping standards and distinctions, the prevalence of 
necessarily subjective analyses, and the impact of the PLSRA result in a 
complicated landscape. In In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Sixth 
Circuit does an admirable job of succinctly and effectively walking through a 
motion to dismiss inquiry for a § 10(b) action. The case establishes a standard 
for corporate scienter that gives courts the flexibility necessary to deliver 
justice in these cases while balancing the relevant concerns. It seems doubtful, 
however, that this standard results in a more favorable environment for 
plaintiffs in § 10(b) actions. Plaintiffs will likely continue to face the same 
challenges in surmounting heightened pleadings requirements, resulting in 
little effect on the ultimate disposition of cases.  
